Re-assigning spheres of influence over the Middle East is old practice for world powers since Sykes-Picot and before. However, the division of spheres of the US and Russia\/USSR over Iraq and Syria respectively seems to hold firm for well over half a century; events since 2003 seem to confirm that the division is respected to a significant degree by the international players (the US and Russia), while the regional players (Turkey and Iran) enjoy major influence across each other over the local players (Iraq and Syria). <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Introduction<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The\nnegotiation of spheres of influence over the territories of the\nMiddle East is an old practice, before the well known agreement of\nSykes-Picot in 1916(1)<\/sup>.\nAt the time the territory known today as Iraq was assigned to the UK\nwhile Syria was assigned to France by mutual agreement. Later,\nBritish influence over Iraq was formalized by a mandate in 1921(2)\n<\/sup>and French mandate\nover Syria in 1923(3)<\/sup>.\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n British\ninfluence continued after the mandate and was formally ended in 1932.\nHowever, the influence continued through the authority of the Iraqi\npolitician Nouri Said(4)<\/sup>.\nSaid leaned to the side of the UK until the US replaced the UK as the\npower of influence in the Baghdad pact(6)<\/sup>.\nThe US celebrated the shift of position of Iraq and Nouri Said to its\nside by staging an official visit of the Iraqi Monarch and Prince\nRegent in 1957, and in mediating between Iraq and Saudi Arabia with a\nblessing by President Eisenhower (18)<\/sup>.\nThe picture of Nouri Said was on the cover of Time Magazine (19)\n<\/sup>and his rise in\nfavor from a British puppet to the status of a national hero such as\nChiang Kai Shek and Syngman Rhee was noted by a well known\ncontemporary British journalist (6)<\/sup>.\nAfter the 1958 coup in Iraq several military juntas came with leftist\nleanings and willingness to seek friendship with Russia\/USSR. The\nrule of the juntas ended with the 2003 invasion by the US, where the\npolitical influence over Iraqi politics was shared between the US and\nIran, with Iran gaining the upper hand due to US policy indecision. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nFrench mandate over Syria was officially ended in 1946 (5)<\/sup>,\nthen its influence gradually eroded until 1956 when Russia began to\nhave significant influence with the sizable supply of military\nequipment and economic aid (13)<\/sup>.\nThe USSR established naval facilities in Tartus, Syria in 1971, then\ncontinuously expanded its presence in Syria since 2009(13)<\/sup>.\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n Events in the Middle East since 2003 leave little doubt that the US and Russia respect each others sphere of influence in the region. The complex model suggested here is simplified by the assumption of exclusivity of spheres of influence. The next section will describe the author’s personal framing of political event in the Middle East, then the model of influence is drawn, suggesting that the element accepting the most influence is the emerging territory of Kurdistan, therefore it has the most potential in stabilizing the region. The remaining section will discuss wishful scenarios of implementing a path for peace. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In\n1974 there was a summit meeting in Vladivostok between president\nGerald Ford of the Unit- ed States and general secretary of the\nSoviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, it was known as the “Vladivostok\nSummit Meeting on Arms Control” (10)<\/sup>.\nThe meeting lasted only two days, the second day was devoted to\ndiscussions on the Middle East. Although President Ford admitted that\nthere were no major breakthroughs that day, an Iraqi diplomat\nstationed in London told me that there was an undeclared accord\nbetween Henry Kissinger and Andrei Gromyko to define the spheres of\ninfluence in the Middle East, the purpose was to reduce the\nlikelihood of direct confrontation in the volatile Middle East. The\naccord recognizes Syria to be in the Soviet sphere while Iraq is to\nremain in the U.S. sphere. The mutual benefits of the accord offered\nboth parties what they wanted; it provided Russia with undisputed\naccess to a naval port in the warm waters of the Mediterranean while\nthe US got unchallenged influence over the vast oil resources of\nIraq. The Iraqi diplomat lamented that the accord was not to the\nbenefit of Iraq and Syria because it robbed them of the political\nchoice of positive neutrality. Positive neutrality was the policy of\nchoice for non-aligned nations in the 1950’s, where a small or\nunderdeveloped neutral nation at the time such as Egypt, India or\nIndonesia basically played the influence of east and west against\neach other in order to get the best economic and military deals for\ntheir countries. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n There\nis a relevant concept from the field of cybernetics: Requisite\nvariety(17)<\/sup> describes the relationship between the variety\nof choice of behaviours (policy alternatives) and environmental\nchallenges to an organism (or an organization), and stipulates that\nthe variety of behaviours must be more than the environmental\nchallenges for survival. Therefore, limiting policy alternatives\nreduces the ability of the receiving players to regulate their\nenvironment, and defining exclusive spheres of influence reduces the\nability of local players to regulate and makes them more dependent on\ntheir sponsors. It may be tempting for international players to\nconclude that dividing spheres of influence is a privilege or an\nexercise of superpower without cost or responsibility, the reality is\nthat local regulation is usually more efficient, less costly and\nfaster than remote control as exercised by international over local\nplayers. Therefore the existence of exclusive spheres of influence\nreduces the self control ability of local players and places more\nburden on international players. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n Previously,\nin 1972 the Soviet Union under Andrei Kosygin signed an official\ntreaty of friendship and cooperation with Iraq(9)<\/sup>,\ntherefore the Vladivostok secret accord may have presented a reversal\nfor US Middle East policy. Historically, Iraq continued leaning\ntoward Russia and to purchase lower priced Russian rather than\noverpriced US made military hardware during Saddam Hussein’s rule and\nuntil 2003 (8)<\/sup>.\nThe US influence did not play out in a large way until 2003, perhaps\nbecause of the independent minded personality of Saddam Hussein. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nexclusivity of spheres of influence provides ample framing for the\nevents in Iraq and Syria since 2003. The framing leads to simplifying\nthe complexity of the proposed Middle East model of influence. Lets\nconsider the history of crisscrossing attempts of influence;\nRussia’s influence over Iraq’s event and the US over Syria’s. \u2028The\nIraq invasion led by the US forces with nominal participation from\nclose allies, the political will behind the invasion was driven\nalmost exclusively by the US president. Russia did not substantially\nchallenge the invasion and did not support the Iraqi regime like it\ndid in past confrontations(20)<\/sup>.\nHowever, in 2003 France Germany and Russia offered the US to\ndowngrade its control in favor of UN control over civil institutions\nand the elections, but the US secretary of state at the time, Colin\nPowell, “ridiculed the idea of giving up power” (21)<\/sup>.\nThis indicates that the US considered itself indeed the exclusive\ninfluencer over Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russian influence in Syria has been consistent and growing since the start of its facilities in Tartus in 1971 and until 2017, when Syria signed a treaty allowing Russia to use and enjoy sovereign jurisdiction over its naval base for 49 years free of charge (13)<\/sup>. Whereas the relationship of the US with Syria were “currently nonexistent” (14) <\/sup>and from the highlights of Obama’s loss of credibility when he did not enforce his well known “red line”(15) <\/sup>on the use of chemical weapons to Trump’s surprise withdrawal plan, the US seems to consistently back off from influence over Syria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n As a complex system the division between US and Russian streams of influence leads to model simplification from one where all players are connected to each other. Figure 1 shows that there are two somewhat independent streams of influence flowing down from the international sponsors to Iraq and Syria. The regional sponsors (Turkey and Iran) who receive influence from the US and Russia, cross over influences to the local players (Iraq and Syria). Regional and local players co-influence on the territory of Kurdistan, where all regional and local players possess territories with Kurdish majority. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Notice\nthe imbalance of regional influence over local players; Iran over\nSyria is not mirrored by political influence of Turkey over Iraq (the\nexistence of substantial Turkish economic benefit does not constitute\npolitical influence over Iraq). Also, the US enjoys major influence\nover Kurdistan while Russia does not. Notice the absence of Israel as\na high influence player; “Israel became the first state to\nendorse an independent Kurdistan”(16)\n<\/sup>yet the US backed\nthe Iraqi military’s successful takeover of Kirkuk after the\nKurdistan independence referendum of 2017 (16)<\/sup>,\nsignifying that Israel’s backing is not sufficient to assure the\nindependence of Kurdistan. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The cybernetic explanation of the model of influence is similar to Ross-Ashby’s Homeostat, where a system made of 4 servo motors coupled to each other is investigated and the boundaries of stability are defined (17)<\/sup>. Here, the element with the highest coupling is the emergent Kurdistan, which suggests that regional stability should start from a design for Kurdistan borders that is acceptable to all local and regional powers. Two paths for stability are suggested, the first involves the full participation, support and agreement of both the US and Russia, the other excludes Russia and Iran, since the perception of victory by both will make it unlikely to cooperate in the creation of new Kurdistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1-\nStable boundary: Defining the boundary of the emergent Kurdistan\nshould serve the purpose of enhancing regional stability as well as\nrealizing the aspirations of the Kurdish people, so that all parties\nrealize everybody’s goals will not be totally met. Ideally, the\ninternational players, the biggest sharks in the pond, should have\ninitial agreement over the future boundaries of independent\nKurdistan, then follow the flow of influence and consult with\nregional then local players before reaching the Kurds for final\nagreement. In reality, there are several factors that make a two side\nagreement unlikely and a single side likely, perhaps the most\nimportant is the security of the emergent Kurdistan: Kurdistan is a\nlandlocked territory, highly vulnerable by its neighbors, its defense\nhas to depend on external international sponsors. It can exist only\nas a member of NATO or in the sphere of Russia’s influence. Since\nIraqi Kurdistan is already in the Iraq US sphere, it is likely to\nstay under US influence, unless US foreign policy commits another\npolicy foolishness! Kurdistan will not be the only country in the\nMiddle East that depends on international (implied) guarantees, \nLebanon and Israel are examples. However, it should be understood\nthat the guarantees mean limitations on the emergent country’s\npolicies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2-\nValid popular representation: Fraud and misrepresentation fraught\nelections in the region in general and in Iraq after 2003 in\nparticular, where there is strong US influence. My personal\ncontribution in support of a fraud-free representation was a petition\nfor UN run Census and Elections in Iraq (12)<\/sup>.\nThe petition received limited popular support and the endorsement of\nonly one socialist Canadian party (NDP). The Iraqi popular awareness\nof fraud contributed in popular boycotting the 2018 elections(23)<\/sup>.\nHowever, the position of the US government under republican and\ndemocratic administrations was the same: To overlook fraud and to\nform government by consensus no matter how widespread is fraud. It\nseemed to me that no one in the US cared, but recently, I found that\nDr. Henry Kissinger supported international supervision of the Iraqi\nelections, I quote from his interview: “it was right to\noverthrow Saddam, but the democratization of Iraq should have been a\nmulti- lateral international effort, if undertaken at all. It should\nnot have remained an exclusively American undertaking” (15)<\/sup>.\nThis was surprising from a well know right wing politician and proves\nthat international supervision of the elections is not an expression\nof liberalism or conservatism, it is a realistic requirement for\nestablishing the validity of popular representation in Iraq or in\nKurdistan. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3- Fair distribution of water: Linking the creation of the emergent Kurdish state with the ratification of a water treaty is vital to its success, without it there is no compensation for loss of territory for the local players, both of which are located downstream. Recent climate conditions (excessive rain and floods) indicate that the problem may not be in long term drought but in controlling extreme transients. A treaty that regulates the distribution of water in times of calm and in crises is economically and politically sensible, and an insurance policy against large migrations across borders of small nations due to natural disasters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second Order Cybernetics (SOC) is the current philosophy of choice for cyberneticians, it is often described as: observing the observer, where reality is constructed from internal concepts within the observer rather that from assumed external objective reality. The cybernetics angle may be described as a kind of political empathy, where reality is relative in the eye of the political observer\/player. The task of the cybernetician is to personify the players and investigate their motivation and sense of reality, emphasizing the differences. Knowing the motivation and sense of reality of each player should help in customizing messages for action. The following are glimpses of what may be the cybernetics of Middle East politics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Elections and referendums in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003 were coerced by the ruling parties (cf. 22)<\/sup>. UN run processes are necessary for legitimate results. Mixed affiliation data may be substantial without coercion and fraud, and the accommodation for dual and multiple citizenship requests should be possible in today’s climate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n An\noverview of the major international influences in the Middle East led\nto a simplified model of influence with two somewhat independent\npaths, the paths meet in the element which represents Kurdistan, a\nplayer in waiting for a definition of borders and supporting\ntreaties. Since Kurdistan receives significant influence from most\nplayers in the region, it shows potential to act as a stabilizer and\na moderator of all influences. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The\ncreation of a new sovereign state in the middle of antagonistic\nneighbors is not a simple matter, if only left to the result of a\nreferendum run by Iraqi Kurdish authorities then the new state will\nprobably have closed borders on all sides and a status similar to\nBerlin after the Second World War. I suggest that the size and\nborders of the new Kurdistan is a major factor in formulating its\nforeign policies and its status in the region. A larger Kurdistan,\ncommensurate with the highest ambitions of its leaders, could lead to\ninternationally neutral but regionally provocative policies, while a\nsmaller Kurdistan will have to depend on international guarantees for\nits sovereignty. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, three significant factors make the emergence of larger Kurdistan from two sides agreement improbable: <\/p>\n\n\n\n A likely one-side solution is not without cautionary warnings, here is a wish list with major risks: <\/p>\n\n\n\n Negotiating international guarantees for Kurdistan. Without guarantees and policy oversight Iraqi Kurdistan will probably succumb to regional threats and fragment into conflicting entities in Irbil and Sulaimania, falling eventually under the hegemony of Turkey and Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally I would like to compare side-by-side two positions of US politicians: Colin Powell and Henry Kissinger; the first refused UN supervision over Iraqi elections, the second called for international supervision. The first is a military leader, the second is a political genius. The comparison makes it so clear that US policy in the Middle East depends on military rather than political vision, and the decision maker in Iraq was and still is the Pentagon, which goes a long way to explain its failure. I believe the independence of Kurdistan should be reached by political rather than military vision as seen by the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan, and if they insist on their short sighted military vision then they will only repeat US failures as before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1- Wikipedia contributors, “Sykes\u2013Picot Agreement,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php? title=Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement&oldid=874928179 (accessed December 25, 2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n 2- Wikipedia contributors, “Mandatory Iraq,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/ en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Mandatory_Iraq&oldid=875023571 (accessed December 25, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3- Wikipedia contributors, “French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=French_Mandate_for_Syri- a_and_the_Lebanon&oldid=869864925 (accessed December 25, 2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n 4- Encyclopaedia Britannica Editors, “Nuri as-Said,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https:\/\/ www.britannica.com\/biography\/Nuri-as-Said, (accessed December 25, 2018) <\/p>\n\n\n\n 5- Wikipedia contributors, “Modern history of Syria,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Modern_history_of_Syria&oldid=872835049 (ac- cessed December 25, 2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n 6- Paul Johnson, Journey Into Chaos, Western Policy in the Middle East. London: MacGibbons and Kee, 1958. PP 76. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 7- William Quandt, Force Without War. Washington: Brookings Institute, 1978. PP 232-253. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 8- Wikipedia contributors, “20th-century history of Iraq,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=20th-century_history_of_Iraq&oldid=869599991 (accessed December 25, 2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n 9-\nWikipedia contributors, “Alexei Kosygin,” Wikipedia, The\nFree Encyclopedia, https:\/\/\nen.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Alexei_Kosygin&oldid=873933658\n(accessed December 26, 2018). \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 10-\nWikipedia contributors, “Vladivostok Summit Meeting on Arms\nControl,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,\nhttps:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Vladivostok_Summit_Meet-\ning_on_Arms_Control&oldid=861533941 (accessed December 30, 2018).\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 11-\nReuters, “Iraq Leans Toward Russia in War on Islamic State”,\nhttps:\/\/www.reuters.com\/ar-\nticle\/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-russia\/iraq-leans-toward-russia-in-war-on-islamic-state-idUSKC-\nN0S112120151007, 2015 \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 12-\nFaisal L. Kadri, “UNCEI-Petition”,\nhttp:\/\/www.montrealiraqi.com\/UN_Petition\/index.htm, 2017 \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 13-\nWikipedia contributors, “Russia\u2013Syria relations,”\nWikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/\nen.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Russia%E2%80%93Syria_relations&oldid=868161515\n(ac- cessed December 28, 2018). \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 14-\nWikipedia contributors, “Syria\u2013United States relations,”\nWikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,\nhttps:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?\ntitle=Syria%E2%80%93United_States_relations&oldid=870272707\n(accessed December 28, 2018). \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 15-\nThe Atlantic, “Kissinger Order and Chaos”,\nhttps:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/international\/ar-\nchive\/2016\/11\/kissinger-order-and-chaos\/506876\/, 2016. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 16-\nWikipedia contributors, “2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence\nreferendum,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,\nhttps:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=2017_Iraqi_Kurdistan_indepen-\ndence_referendum&oldid=875344247 (accessed December 28, 2018). \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 17-\nWilliam Ross-Ashby, \u201cDesign for a Brain\u201d, Electronic Engineering,\n20, 379-383, December 1948. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 18-\nEditor, \u201cThe Nation: A New Concord\u201d, Time Magazine, Feb 18, 1957.\n19- Editor, Iraq: \u201cThe Pasha\u201d, Time Magazine, June 17, 1957. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 20-\nWikipedia contributors, “2003 invasion of Iraq,” Wikipedia,\nThe Free Encyclopedia, https:\/\/\nen.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=2003_invasion_of_Iraq&oldid=875809184\n(accessed De- cember 31, 2018). \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 21-\nEditor, The Sydney Morning Herald, \u201cFrance, Germany, Russia offer\nUS trade-off on Iraq\u201d ,\nhttps:\/\/www.smh.com.au\/world\/middle-east\/france-germany-russia-offer-us-trade-off-on-iraq-\n20030912-gdhdkl.html, Sep 12, 2003. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n 22- The National, \u201cKDP wins Iraqi Kurdistan elections in vote marred by fraud allegations\u201d, https:\/\/www.thenational.ae\/world\/mena\/kdp-wins-iraqi-kurdistan-elections-in-vote-marred-by- fraud-allegations-1.782818 <\/p>\n\n\n\nFraming the Middle East Events: Personal Reflections <\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Modeling Regional Influence <\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/montrealiraqi.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/11\/ME_EngRedy.jpg\")
Figure 1 Suggested diagram of major international influence flow in the Middle East. <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nThe Three Elements of Stability <\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
What’s in it for Me? The Cybernetics of Politics <\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Conclusions <\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
References<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n